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Abstract
Background: The influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus has been a challenge for public health surveillance systems in all countries.
In Antananarivo, the first imported case was reported on August 12, 2009. This work describes the spread of A(H1N1)pdm09
in Madagascar.
Methods: The diffusion of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in Madagascar was explored using notification data from a sentinel
network. Clinical data were charted to identify peaks at each sentinel site and virological data was used to confirm viral
circulation.
Results: From August 1, 2009 to February 28, 2010, 7,427 patients with influenza-like illness were reported. Most patients
were aged 7 to 14 years. Laboratory tests confirmed infection with A(H1N1)pdm09 in 237 (33.2%) of 750 specimens. The
incidence of patients differed between regions. By determining the epidemic peaks we traced the diffusion of the epidemic
through locations and time in Madagascar. The first peak was detected during the epidemiological week 47-2009 in
Antananarivo and the last one occurred in week 07-2010 in Tsiroanomandidy.
Conclusion: Sentinel surveillance data can be used for describing epidemic trends, facilitating the development of
interventions at the local level to mitigate disease spread and impact.
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Introduction
The transmission of A(H1N1)pdm09-person to person-is similar
to that of other seasonal influenza viruses. Influenza viruses spread
rapidly through infected air-borne droplets that are generated by
coughing or sneezing. Hands are a major alternative route of viral
spread, and can be contaminated ‘‘directly’’, when droplets land
on the hands from an infected person coughing nearby, or
‘‘indirectly’’, when hands pick up the virus by touching
contaminated objects or surfaces. The infectious period for
a confirmed case is from one day before the onset of symptoms
to seven days after onset [1–2].
As concerns community-wide diffusion, influenza epidemics are
widespread outbreaks of highly contagious respiratory disease that
appear suddenly. Influenza pandemics are characterized by the
rapid worldwide spread of a virus to which humans have had no
previous exposure.
In infectious disease epidemiology, diffusion is an important
concept depicting the dynamics of the spread of a microorganism
through time and space [3]. To understand the spread of influenza
in a community, it is necessary to study epidemiological and
virological conditions and the geographical determinants of
influenza during a pandemic [4]. Diverse factors influence the
spread of epidemics through human populations, particularly the
characteristics of the pathogen responsible for the infection [5],
human mobility patterns [6,7], the sociodemographic structure of
the population [4,8] and intervention measures.
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On a population level, influenza spreads both by contagious
diffusion (wave-like from one or more central foci) and hierarchical
diffusion (movement from larger to smaller towns) [9]. The spread
of influenza epidemics is linked more to the rates of movement of
people to and from work than to geographical distance or air
travel [10]. Also, the virus spreads more rapidly in more densely
populated locations.
Recently, the A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza virus swept rapidly
across the world after its first detection in humans in April 2009 in
Mexico and the US [11,12]. The A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic virus
is now well-characterized biologically, clinically and epidemiolog-
ically [13]. However, little is known about the timing and impact
of pandemic influenza in Africa.
The first reported case of A(H1N1)pdm09 influenza to be
imported into Madagascar was August 12th, 2009. The first
laboratory-confirmed cases without travel history were detected on
October 8th, 2009: three teenagers attending one of the largest
schools in Antananarivo [14]. The first wave of A(H1N1)pdm09
peaked in November 2009 in Antananarivo.
Here, we report an analysis of the diffusion pattern of influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus by examining all clinical cases reported to
the sentinel network. This network allowed the pandemic to be
monitored nationwide in real time.
Results
Characteristics of the data from sentinel visits
The data, collected on a daily basis between August 1st, 2009
and February 28th, 2010 from the 24 sentinel centers, corre-
sponded to 142,744 visits (Figure 1); 81.0% of the data were
transmitted within 24 h to IPM.
A total of 18,307 cases (12.8%) presented a fever syndrome. A
fever-specific form was completed by 12,334 of these patients
(67.4%). The sex ratio (male/female) of those with fever syndrome
was 0.8; age was available for 12,136 patients (98.4%), and the
mean age of these patients was 12.7 years (95%CI: [12.4–12.9]).
Of the patients with a completed fever-specific form, 7,427 cases
(60.2%) presented an ILI. The sex ratio (male/female) for those
with ILI was 0.9; age was available for 7,316 patients (98.5%), and
their mean age was 10.9 years (95%CI: [10.7–11.3]).
Of the patients who presented with ILI, 750 (10.1%) were
sampled for laboratory confirmation. Infection with
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus was confirmed for 237 (33.2%) patients.
The age was available for 233 of these patients (98.3%), and their
mean age was 12.6 years (95%CI: [11.1–14.1]).
The age distribution by overall number of visits and febrile
syndromes is listed in Table 1. ILI, sampling and laboratory results
differed significantly between age groups (p-value,0.01). The
proportion of ILI among those with fever syndromes was lower in
the population over 25 years old, and the proportion of positive
results was higher in the age 5–14year-old group (logistic
regression: p-value,0.01).
The clinical symptoms are shown in Table 2. The most frequent
symptoms presented by A(H1N1)pdm09-positive patients were
fever (100%), cough (99.1%), headache (40.1%) and runny nose
(38.0%). However, logistic regression analysis of the main
symptoms (cough, headache, runny nose, asthenia, sore throat,
vomiting, shivering) adjusted for age group only identified
a relationship between A(H1N1)pdm09 positivity and runny nose
(OR=1.5; p = 0.03).
No case with pneumonia or respiratory failure, requiring
ventilation, was reported. Other severe symptoms such as multiple
organ failure were not reported.
Spatio-temporal diffusion patterns: the road of the peaks
Figure 2 shows the progress of the epidemic as assessed from the
cases of ILI reported to IPM by the sentinel network. The first
peak of ILI (989.3 per thousand visits with fever) was detected
during Week 47-2009, in Antananarivo. In this city, cases were
confirmed between Week 34 and the first week of 2010 (Table 3).
Most cases were confirmed during the first school outbreak which
occurred in Week 42-2009. The peak of confirmed cases in
Antananarivo occurred in Week 45 (Figure 3) after which
systematic detection of all suspected cases ceased.
The incidence of ILI was also evaluated by region (Table 3).
The peaks were observed through the various sentinel centers in
Madagascar and occurred from Weeks 47-2009 to 07-2010
(Figure 2).
Discussion
We studied the epidemiology of the current pandemic of
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in Madagascar, including the
temporal and geographic pattern of spread and the clinical
characteristics of A(H1N1)pdm09 disease among ILI patients. We
characterized the range and chronology of the pandemic in
Madagascar with real-time data from a sentinel network.
This is the first description of overall trends of pandemic
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection in Madagascar. This country
was one of the first countries in Africa to report laboratory-
confirmed cases of this new influenza virus: cases of pandemic
influenza were detected in Madagascar before mass gatherings
occurred. All of the initial sporadic cases identified were imported
(from India, Mauritius and Reunion Island). The sentinel
surveillance networks which have been operational since 2007
[15] presumably contributed to this because coverage was good in
high density population settings; the updated information given to
health care professionals in June 2009 during an influenza
workshop organized by Institut Pasteur from Madagascar may
also have contributed.
The pattern of spread of A(H1N1)pdm09 in Madagascar was
dominated by a wave that emanated from the capital, Antananar-
ivo. The early dynamics of this wave might have been associated
Figure 1. Flow charts of cases from visits to influenza results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.g001
2009 Pandemic Influenza in Madagascar
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e37067
with a high frequency of international travel, increasing the risks of
a major epidemic in the capital city [10].
It was challenging to implement the early phase of the WHO
recommendations concerning the epidemic. Thus, epidemiological
investigation was crucial to monitor the epidemic better,
particularly to identify risk groups and factors that contributed
to the development of the epidemic. An understanding of the
epidemiology of past pandemics, and in particular the last
A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic, may help health authorities to prepare
and implement response programs to subsequent waves and
pandemics [16].
Collecting relevant information on pre-existing chronic condi-
tions and complications among hospitalized cases could be
valuable to fill the gaps in the existing epidemiological data.
However, in Madagascar, like in others developing countries, the
level of hospital care is poor, and there is a lack of influenza
surveillance in hospitals (e.g. concerning severe cases). This
weakness with regard to surveillance, and hospitalization costs
for patients, need to be considered and overcome so as strengthen
surveillance systems with data from hospitals.
Our report demonstrates that the signs and symptoms in ILI or
confirmed cases are similar to those observed in patients with
seasonal influenza [16,17]. We observed that sampling children
aged under 1 year old was much less effective than that for other
groups. The proportions of patients sampled did not differ
between the other age groups, and the positivity rate for
A(H1N1)pdm09 was high in patients aged between 4 and 15
years. One characteristic of this pandemic is that it dispropor-
Table 1. Distribution of overall visits, fever-related illnesses, influenza-1-like illnesses, and positive results by age.
Age group
All visits
(n= 142,563)
Fever syndromes
(n=12,136) ILI syndromes (n =7,316) Sampled ILI (n = 740)
A(H1N1)pdm positive
(n=233)
n (%) n (%) n (%) p n (%) p n (%) P*
,1 year 14,142 (9.9) 1,394 (11.5) 951 (68.2) ,0.01 53 (6.1) ,0.01 11 (20.7) ---
1–4 years 23,774 (16.7) 3,249 (26.8) 2,212 (68.1) ,0.01 223 (11.2) 0.1 52 (23.3) 0.7
5–14 years 24,579 (17.2) 3,485 (28.7) 2,175 (62.4) ,0.01 237 (11.3) 0.1 97 (40.9) ,0.01
15–24 years 26,415 (18.5) 1,944 (16.0) 1,028 (52.8) ,0.01 110 (11.2) 0.2 36 (32.7) 0.1
$25 years 53,653 (37.6) 2,064 (17.0) 950 (46.0) --- 117 (13.1) --- 37 (31.6) 0.2
*comparison of A(H1N1)pdm positivity by age using logistic regression analysis.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.t001
Table 2. Distribution of symptoms among ILI and confirmed cases of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection declared by the
sentinel network in Madagascar.
Symptoms All ILI (n = 7,427) Sampled ILI (n = 750) Confirmed Cases (n=237)
n (%) n (%) n (%)
GENERAL
Fever 7,427 (100.0) 750 (100.0) 237 (100.0)
Headache 3,236 (58.1) 281 (47.1) 95 (40.1)
Muscle pain 486 (11.9) 52 (10.7) 20 (8.4)
Join pain 870 (20.5) 68 (13.9) 13 (5.5)
Asthenia 1,047 (14.1) 93 (12.4) 32 (13.5)
Shiver 1,445 (19.5) 130 (17.3) 37 (15.5)
RESPIRATORY
Cough 6,816 (92.6) 743 (99.1) 235 (99.1)
Sore throat 1,425 (19.2) 96 (12.8) 31 (13.1)
Runny nose 2,283 (30.7) 239 (31.8) 90 (38.0)
Shortness of breath 287 (3.9) 42 (5.2) 5 (2.1)
GASTRO INTESTINAL
Diarrhea 770 (10.4) 85 (11.3) 22 (9.3)
Vomiting 984 (13.2) 88 (11.7) 31 (13.1)
Nausea 564 (7.6) 55 (7.3) 12 (5.1)
OTHERS
Retro-orbital pain 81 (2.1) 10 (2.2) 2 (0.8)
Hemorrhagic sign 57 (1.5) 4 (0.8) 2 (0.8)
Skin rash 137 (3.6) 7 (1.5) 0 (0.0)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.t002
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tionately affected children and young adults [18]; indeed, a study
in the USA reported that 60% of confirmed A(H1N1)pdm09 cases
were aged 18 years or younger [19].
We also observed that transmission of the influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus during the pandemic in Madagascar, like
in other countries, appeared to be inevitable, presumably due to
the nature of the infection: the virus spread despite preparations to
mitigate the situation, including systematic detection of all
suspected cases, social distancing options (such as school closure)
and antiviral treatment of all confirmed cases and their contacts
during the early stage of the epidemic. However, in Madagascar
like in other remote areas, the impact of vaccination or timely
oseltamivir use on influenza transmission was probably low
because these measures were unavailable throughout the country.
As in other countries [20–22], there were regional differences in
the trend of the epidemic and the timeline of A(H1N1)pdm09
spread, and the causes are not easily explained. These differences
may be associated with the demographic structure or population
density of these regions. The region specificity of the pattern
requires further examination.
Data from Madagascar, like those from others countries [23],
suggest that the A(H1N1)pdm09 virus spreads rapidly through
communities once introduced from an affected area. For the
specific case of Madagascar Island, the principal spread of
infection took approximately 3–4 months. This rapid spread of
pandemic influenza infection across the whole country under-
scores the need for real-time surveillance systems to track viral
activity across regions and districts.
In conclusion, the sentinel data allowed description of the
pattern of disease activity. Both seasonal and pandemic influenza
surveillance, using sentinel data, is informative when combined
with laboratory testing. We advocate (i) enhancing the surveillance
capacity with the aim of mitigating the course of future epidemics
early, (ii) strengthening surveillance efforts, and (iii) promoting
information sharing in Africa because the influenza epidemiology
on the continent is largely unknown. In addition population-based
serological surveys should be performed to generate more accurate
estimates of the epidemic’s impact.
Methods
Subjects
Before the pandemic was declared in Madagascar, the
surveillance aimed to identify cases in travelers returning from
affected areas to allow prompt implementation of control measures
around each case (nasal swab, and antiviral treatment if case was
confirmed) and to contain viral spread. Antiviral prophylaxis was
recommended for close contacts of confirmed cases, who were
asked to quarantine themselves at home.
The case management protocol was updated according to the
general dissemination of the virus and the start of transmission in
the community; ultimately, the protocol was limited to patients
with known risk factors and hospitalized cases.
As described previously [15], the sentinel surveillance network
was based on daily declaration by volunteer general practitioners
(GPs) throughout the 22 regions of Madagascar. Participating GPs
reported daily the total number of consultations and any patients
who presented with influenza-like illness (ILI), defined as observed
fever (.38uC) and cough or sore throat.
With the emergence of the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus, the
following case definitions of suspected and confirmed cases were
used:
A suspected case of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection
was defined as a person with ILI who meets at least one of the
following epidemiological criteria of the WHO case definition
Figure 2. Time series distribution of the fever syndromes, ILI and confirmed influenza cases in the major cities of Madagascar.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.g002
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protocol [24]: (i) returned from a country or region with an
epidemic of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus within the last seven
days, (ii) was in close contact with a confirmed case within the past
seven days, or (iii) handled samples suspected of containing
influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 virus in a laboratory or other setting
within the past seven days. A confirmed case of influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 virus infection was defined as a person with
laboratory confirmation by real-time PCR. For each case, we
collected demographic (including age and sex) and clinical (fever,
cough) data on a dedicated fever case report form.
Laboratory confirmation
Nose and throat swabs were collected from all suspected cases
during the first step of the spread and on a random basis during
community spread. Respiratory specimens were placed in
universal transport media (Copan, Italia), and transported at
Figure 3. A(H1N1)pdm09 diffusion in Madagascar-the ‘‘peaks road.’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.g003
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4uC twice per week from sentinel sites to the National Influenza
Center (NIC) at the Institut Pasteur of Madagascar (IPM) for
confirmation. Specimens were stored at 4uC before being tested by
PCR.
Samples were also tested for other seasonal influenza viruses
during the period (Influenza types B and A, and subtypes AH1
seasonal and AH3 seasonal)
The CDC Real-Time RT-PCR Protocol for the detection and
characterization of human and swine influenza was used to
confirm cases. It includes panels of oligonucleotide primers and
dual-labeled hydrolysis (TaqmanH) probes for in vitro qualitative
detection and characterization of human and swine influenza
viruses in respiratory specimens [25]. The Ambion Ag-Path One-
Step RT-PCR kit was used for this assay.
Data analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using R version 2.12.0 [26].
Arcview 9.2 was used for mapping.
Descriptive analyses comprised assessing frequency distributions
and proportions for each variable category. Fisher’s exact test for
categorical variables was used for group comparisons, and
ANOVA for continuous variables. P values were two-sided.
Logistic regression analysis was performed to measure the
association between ILI or laboratory results and each indepen-
dent variable (symptom, age group). Odds ratios (ORs) and 95%
confidence intervals (CIs) were calculated from aˆ coefficients and
their standard errors.
Ethical clearance
The data were collected by routine surveillance and were
anonymous; thus, the epidemiologists running the surveillance
network had ethical and professional obligations to maximize the
benefits of the studies to the participants and society, and minimize
potential harm (such as loss of privacy and confidentiality). These
risks were remote possibilities due to the steps that were taken to
safeguard confidentiality: they included data encryption, written
procedures for confidentiality, and appropriate staff training.
Malagasy public health authorities can legally collect and receive
information for the purposes of preventing and controlling disease,
injury, and disability. Hence, no specific ethics approval is
required for public health practice activities such as surveillance.
Nevertheless, verbal informed consent-as noted on the form by the
primary health care staff-was obtained from each patient, or from
at least one parent for children, before sampling under the
principle of respect for individual freedom.
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Table 3. Incidence of ILI during each regional peak.
Sentinel Center
Weeks of viral circulation
(first-last) Week of the ILI peak
Incidence of fever
syndromes per thousand
visits
Incidence of ILI per thousand
visits with fever
Antananarivo 34th 2009–01st 2010 47th 2009 62.3 989.3
Taolagnaro 42nd 2009–02nd 2010 48th 2009 326.8 273.8
Toamasina 42nd 2009–50th 2009 49th 2009 503.2 562.3
Antsirabe 44th 2009–02nd 2010 49th 2009 281.0 891.7
Fianarantsoa 48th 2009–52nd 2010 49th 2009 222.2 200.0
Moramanga 48th 2009–52nd 2010 50th 2009 424.2 46.3
Mahajanga 44th 2009–09th 2010 50th 2009 294.5 336.6
Farafangana 46th 2009 50th 2009 215.7 597.4
Antsiranana 43rd 2009–03rd 2010 51st 2009 330.1 543.5
Nosy Be No swab 51st 2009 461.0 538.5
Antsohihy 36th 2009 51st 2009 391.3 111.1
Ihosy No swab 52nd 2009 435.9 117.6
Toliara 47th 2009–06th 2010 52nd 2009 38.2 333.3
Ambatondrazaka No swab 53rd 2009 135.1 600.0
Morondava 52th 2009–01st 2010 01st 2010 124.7 150.9
Maevatanana 49th 2009–08th 2010 01st 2010 221.7 446.9
Sambava No swab 03rd 2010 271.3 57.9
Tsiroanomandidy 49th 2009–08th 2010 07th 2010 195.1 250.0
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0037067.t003
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